> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.polyranger.com/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.
# Market Resolution & UMA Oracle
> How PolyRanger markets get resolved — and how anyone can participate in the process as an Asserter, Disputer, or Voter
## Overview
When you trade on a PolyRanger native market, you're taking a position on a real-world event: an election result, a sports outcome, a protocol launch, or anything else that can be publicly verified. Once the event happens and the market closes, the platform needs a trustless, manipulation-resistant way to confirm what actually occurred and trigger payouts.
PolyRanger uses the **UMA Optimistic Oracle (OO)** for this. UMA is a decentralized verification protocol that brings real-world outcomes on-chain without relying on a centralized administrator. Instead of a single authority deciding the result, UMA uses economic incentives and community voting to arrive at the correct answer — automatically and transparently.
The UMA Oracle only applies to **PolyRanger native markets** — markets created directly on PolyRanger. For aggregated third-party markets (Polymarket, Kalshi, etc.), resolution is handled by those platforms under their own rules.
***
## How resolution works: the full flow
After a market closes on PolyRanger, the result goes through a structured two-layer verification process before payouts are released.
### Layer 1 — Optimistic Oracle (fast lane)
The Optimistic Oracle is designed for speed. It works on a simple principle: **assume honesty by default, but make dishonesty expensive**.
After a market closes, an **Asserter** submits the proposed outcome on-chain along with a financial bond (collateral in USDC). A **liveness period** then begins — a window of time (typically 2 hours to 2 days) during which anyone can challenge the assertion.
* If no one disputes the answer before the window expires, the result is accepted automatically and the market settles
* If someone disputes the assertion, the question escalates to Layer 2
### Layer 2 — Data Verification Mechanism (dispute court)
The DVM is UMA's backstop. When a dispute is raised, \$UMA token stakers vote on the correct outcome. The vote concludes after a 48–96 hour voting period, after which the DVM aggregates all votes to determine the final outcome.
The losing side of the dispute (asserter or disputer) forfeits their bond. The winning side receives it as a reward for honest participation.
### End-to-end flow
```
PolyRanger market closes
↓
Asserter submits outcome + bond
↓
Liveness period begins (2h – 2 days)
↓
No dispute? ──→ Outcome accepted ──→ Market settles ✅
Disputed? ──→ Escalates to DVM
↓
UMA stakers vote (48–96h)
↓
Correct outcome confirmed
↓
Market settles ✅
```
Disputes are rare in practice. Because bonds are at stake and the economic incentives strongly favor honesty, the vast majority of assertions pass through the liveness period unchallenged.
***
## The four roles
Anyone can participate in the resolution process. There are four roles:
| Role | Who they are | What they do |
| ------------- | -------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------- |
| **Requester** | The PolyRanger smart contract | Asks the oracle "what happened?" when a market closes |
| **Asserter** | Any wallet (you, a bot, a third party) | Submits the proposed outcome on-chain with a bond |
| **Disputer** | Any wallet that disagrees | Challenges the asserter's answer by posting a counter-bond |
| **Voter** | \$UMA token stakers | Vote to resolve disputes through the DVM |
***
## How to participate as an Asserter
An Asserter is anyone who submits the outcome of a closed PolyRanger market to the oracle.
**When to assert:** After a market's end date has passed and the real-world event has clearly concluded.
**How it works:**
1. Go to [oracle.uma.xyz](https://oracle.uma.xyz) and find the open request for the PolyRanger market
2. Review the market question and the verifiable real-world outcome
3. Submit your answer (YES or NO) along with the required bond in USDC
4. Wait out the liveness period
**If your assertion is correct and undisputed:** you get your bond back in full after the liveness window closes.
**If your assertion is disputed and the DVM confirms you were right:** you get your bond back plus half of the disputer's bond as a reward.
**If your assertion is disputed and you were wrong:** you lose your bond.
Do not submit an assertion before the event has officially concluded. Premature submissions — even with a factually correct answer — are considered invalid and result in a lost bond. See the P4 "Too Early" rule below.
***
## How to participate as a Disputer
A Disputer is anyone who believes a submitted assertion is incorrect and wants to challenge it.
**When to dispute:** During the liveness period of an active assertion, if you believe the submitted outcome is wrong.
**How it works:**
1. Go to the **Verify** tab at [oracle.uma.xyz](https://oracle.uma.xyz)
2. Browse active assertions currently in their liveness period
3. Find the PolyRanger market assertion you want to challenge
4. Post a counter-bond and submit your dispute
**If you dispute and the DVM confirms you were right:** you receive half of the asserter's bond as a reward.
**If you dispute and the DVM rules against you:** you lose your bond.
Disputing is a meaningful economic action, not just a flag. Only dispute if you have genuine reason to believe the assertion is wrong — and can point to publicly verifiable evidence.
***
## How to participate as a Voter
Voters are \$UMA token stakers who resolve disputes through the DVM when an assertion is challenged. Voting is the final layer of resolution — the community collectively determines the truth.
### Step 1 — Get and stake \$UMA
Purchase \$UMA on any major exchange or DEX on Ethereum Mainnet.
Go to the [UMA voting app](https://vote.uma.xyz), connect your wallet, and stake your \$UMA. Staked \$UMA earns continuous token emissions (displayed as an APY in the dApp) and gives you voting rights on active disputes.
You must have staked \$UMA **before** a voting round begins to be eligible to vote in that round.
### Step 2 — Commit your vote (first 24 hours)
When a dispute from a PolyRanger market reaches the DVM, a 48-hour voting round opens. The first 24 hours are the **commit phase**:
1. Open [vote.uma.xyz](https://vote.uma.xyz) and find the active dispute
2. Read the market question and review publicly available information about the outcome
3. Select your answer from the dropdown — typically **Yes**, **No**, **P4: Too Early**, or **Unresolvable**
4. Click **Commit Vote** and sign the transaction
Your vote is submitted as an encrypted hash during this phase — no one can see how you voted. This prevents voters from blindly copying each other and ensures genuine, independent decisions.
### Step 3 — Reveal your vote (next 24 hours)
After the commit phase ends, the **reveal phase** begins. Return to the dApp and reveal your committed vote so it can be counted.
If you commit but do not reveal, your vote is **not counted** — and you may be slashed. Always complete both steps.
### Step 4 — Claim your rewards
After the round concludes, claim your rewards in the dApp:
* **Claim & Restake** — compound your rewards back into your stake
* **Claim to Wallet** — withdraw rewards directly to your wallet
***
## Voting options explained
When voting on a disputed PolyRanger market outcome, you will see these choices:
| Option | When to use it |
| ----------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **Yes** | The event described in the market question clearly occurred |
| **No** | The event clearly did not occur |
| **P4: Too Early** | The assertion was submitted before the event officially concluded |
| **Unresolvable** | The outcome cannot be clearly determined from publicly available information |
### The P4 "Too Early" rule
P4 is a special vote for premature assertions. If an Asserter submits an outcome before the event has officially ended — even if the answer would eventually be correct — the valid vote is **P4: Too Early**, and the Asserter loses their bond.
> **Example:** A market asks "Will Team A win the championship?" The final game ends at 10:04 PM. An Asserter submits "YES" at 10:03 PM — one minute before the official end. Even if Team A won, the submission is premature. Voters should vote **P4**, and the Asserter forfeits their bond.
***
## Rewards and penalties for voters
UMA aligns voter incentives with honesty through a rewards and slashing system.
**Rewards:**
* All stakers earn a continuous pro-rata share of \$UMA token emissions just for having tokens staked
* Correct voters receive a share of tokens slashed from incorrect or absent voters
* Voters staking ≥ 500 \$UMA are eligible for monthly ETH gas rebates covering commit and reveal transactions
**Penalties:**
* Voting with the minority or missing a vote results in a slash of approximately 0.1% of your staked balance per vote. Slashed tokens are redistributed to correct voters.
Stakers who never vote effectively earn 0% — their slashed balance cancels out their emissions. Active, correct voters gradually own a larger share of the protocol over time.
***
## How UMA decides: the core philosophy
UMA does not act as a strict legal arbitrator interpreting fine print. Its decisions are based on **broad public consensus** — what a reasonable, informed person would conclude from publicly available information.
Key principles voters apply when resolving PolyRanger markets:
* **Spirit over letter** — the common understanding of the market question matters more than a narrow technical reading of its wording
* **Public verifiability** — outcomes must be determinable from public sources; private knowledge or speculation does not count
* **Not a court** — attempts to "lawyer" a result through edge-case arguments are unlikely to succeed with UMA voters
* **Schelling Point** — voters independently converge on the most obvious correct answer because their financial incentives align with honesty and consensus
***
## Security model
The UMA oracle is secured by economic guarantees, not by trusting any single party. Corrupting a result would require an attacker to acquire a supermajority of all staked \$UMA — an attack that would cost more than any realistic financial gain and would simultaneously destroy the value of the attacker's own holdings.
The DVM requires at least **65% of staked \$UMA** to vote and agree on the same outcome for a round to finalize. If this threshold is not reached, the vote rolls into the next round.
***
## Useful links
Browse active assertions and submit or dispute outcomes
Stake \$UMA and vote on active disputes
Full UMA protocol documentation
PolyRanger's Market Rules & Resolution Policy